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There is widespread agreement in neuroscience and psychology that the visual 
system identifies objects and faces based on a pattern of activation over many 
neurons, each neuron being involved in representing many different categories.  
The hypothesis that the visual system includes finely-tuned neurons for specific 
objects or faces for the sake of identification – so-called ‘grandmother cells’ – is 
widely rejected. Here we argue that the rejection of grandmother cells is 
premature.  Grandmother cells constitute a hypothesis of how familiar visual 
categories are identified, but the primary evidence against this hypothesis comes 
from studies that have failed to observe neurons that selectively respond to 
unfamiliar stimuli.  We review these findings and show why they are irrelevant.  
Neuroscientists need to better understand existing models of face and object 
identification that include grandmother cells, and then compare the selectivity 






The hypothesis that single neurons mediate the identification of familiar 
visual categories (e.g., a familiar person) is often dismissed in neuroscience. 
Indeed, researchers tend to use the somewhat pejorative phrase ‘grandmother 
cell’ to describe this form of neural coding. Instead, it is widely claimed that 
visual categories are identified on the basis of a pattern of activation over many 
neurons, each neuron being involved in representing many different categories; 
so-called ‘distributed’ or ‘ensemble’ coding. The distributed approach is 
thought to be supported by theoretical considerations and empirical findings. 
Indeed, single-cell recording studies are often taken to falsify the grandmother 
cell hypothesis.[1] 
In this article, we detail why the widespread dismissal of grandmother 
cells is misguided. The core problem is that researchers tend to consider straw-
man versions of the hypothesis, and as a consequence, do not carry out 
experiments relevant to testing more plausible versions of the theory. We focus 
on one of the most common theoretical confusions that has led to a consistent 
failure to carry out relevant experiment, namely, the claim that grandmother 
cells constitute a theory of how both familiar and unfamiliar categories are 
perceived. Researchers then reject grandmother cells when they do not find 
neurons that respond selectively to unfamiliar stimuli (e.g., failing to find a 
neuron that selectively responds to an unfamiliar face). The problem with this, 
however, is that grandmother cells constitute a theory of how familiar categories 
are identified (e.g., how you identify your grandmother and how I recognize 
mine). Accordingly, the relevant question is how neurons respond to familiar 
faces, objects, and words when they are identified. As we detail below, 
relatively few studies assess the selectivity of neurons under these conditions, 
but there is evidence that neural selectivity is greater for familiar than 
unfamiliar categories.  Indeed, given the high-level of selectivity that has been 
reported with familiar visual categories when they are identified, the 
grandmother cell hypothesis should be taken as a serious hypothesis rather than 
dismissed out of hand.   
This article is organized as follows. First, we describe in some detail what 
we mean by the term grandmother cell, and then briefly describe a number of 
computational models of face, word, and object identification in psychology and 
neuroscience that implement grandmother cells.  Second, we briefly review 
studies that assessed the response selectivity of single neurons in monkey visual 
cortex to unfamiliar stimuli (e.g., unfamiliar faces or objects), or familiar 
stimuli that the monkey was never trained to identify (novel stimuli that the 
monkey repeatedly viewed without any need to categorize).  Some of these 
studies are reviewed in the text, others are just noted in Table 1.  Although these 




(e.g., a specific face), these studies are irrelevant to the grandmother cell 
hypothesis because grandmother cells constitute a theory of how familiar visual 
images are identified as members of specific categories. Third, we review 
several studies that do report highly selective responses in visual neurons when 
monkeys were tested on familiar stimuli they could identify – exactly the 
conditions in which grandmother cell theories predict highly selective 
responding.  Finally, we briefly mention computational studies that show there 
are computational advantages with grandmother cell representations. Together, 
these empirical and computational studies show that it is premature to reject 
grandmother cells. 
1.1. What is the grandmother cell hypothesis?  
A grandmother cell is a neuron that represents a single familiar visual 
category, either a basic level category (e.g., a cell that represents the visual 
category ‘dog’, or ‘bicycle’) or a subordinate level category (e.g., a cell that 
represents the visual category ‘my bicycle’, or a specific person such as ‘my 
grandmother’).  On this hypothesis, an object is identified at a basic level or 
subordinate level when the corresponding cell(s) fires beyond some threshold.[2] 
Grandmother cells are often compared to highly-sparse representations in which 
a visual category is represented by a small number of neurons, each neuron only 
contributing to the representation a few different visual categories. However, 
the grandmother cell hypothesis is at the extreme end of the sparseness 
continuum: a single neuron represents a single visual category.[3] It should be 
noted that grandmother cell theories are not committed to the claim that all 
neurons are grandmother cells, and indeed, some combination of grandmother 
cells and distributed representations may work hand-in-hand in some tasks. By 
contrast, critics of grandmother cell theories reject the hypothesis that there are 
any grandmother cells.  Within psychology, the equivalent to a grandmother cell 
is a localist representation in which single units in models encode specific visual 
categories at a basic or subordinate level. In this situation, the model identifies 
inputs by activating single units above some threshold. Unlike grandmother 
cells in neuroscience, localist representations in psychology are not couched in 
neuroscience terms, but functionally, grandmother cells and localist 
representations are equivalent.[4-6]  Grandmother cells and localist 
representations constitute a hypothesis about how all basic and subordinate 
visual categories are identified,  not only about how we identify faces at a 
subordinate level. 
1.2. Understanding Grandmother Cells Through Modelling.  
In order to better understand the grandmother cell hypothesis, it is worth 
briefly reviewing a few models in computer science, neuroscience and 
psychology that include grandmother cells (or their equivalent localist coding) 




The initial motivation for many of these models was the observation that the 
visual system is hierarchical: ‘simple’ cells in the visual cortex code for line 
orientations at a given retinal location, and neurons in subsequent layers of the 
hierarchy code for more abstract (e.g., more spatially invariant) and complex 
stimuli.[3] According to the grandmother cell hypothesis, this process of 
abstraction continues over multiple layers, the neurons at the top of the visual 
hierarchy coding for complete objects or persons in such a way that a single 
neuron responds more strongly to images of this category compared to others. 
Hubel himself considered whether grandmother cells are the natural extension 
of his theory of early vision, writing: 
“What happens beyond the primary visual area, and how is the 
information on orientation exploited at later stages? Is one to imagine 
ultimately finding a cell that responds specifically to some very particular 
item (Usually one’s grandmother is selected as the particular item, for 
reasons that escape us.) Our answer is that we doubt there is such a cell, 
but we have no good alternative to offer.” (p. 96)[7] 
1.3. Grandmother cells in computer science and neuroscience models 
Although Hubel doubts that there are cells that code for visual categories 
at the top of the visual hierarchy, it is important to note that there are many 
computational models that have just this property. An early example in 
computer science was the “neocognitron” model[8] that was directly inspired by 
Hubel and Wiesel’s model[3] of simple and complex cells in primary visual 
cortex (V1). The neocognitron model roughly simulated the early processes in 
V1 and continued the hierarchy of processing steps to a top layer that coded 
each familiar category (written numbers between 0-9) with a single unit that 
selectively respond to one number. Indeed, the authors used the term 
‘grandmother cell’ to describe these selective units in their model.  The 
neocognitron was in turn one of the inspirations for computational models in 
neuroscience that include units that selectively represent familiar categories, 
such as a face of a specific person (e.g., [9]).    
More recently, Thorpe and colleagues[10, 11] have been developing 
hierarchical artificial neural networks that incorporate the biologically plausible 
learning rule spike-time-dependent-plasticity (STDP). STDP is an unsupervised 
form of learning that adjusts the connection strengths based on the relative 
timing of a particular neuron’s output and input action potentials. Importantly 
for present purposes, models of object identification that employ STDP often 
learn highly selective units, as illustrated in Figure 1a. In multiple papers, 
Thorpe highlights the computational advantages of highly selective 
representations and explicitly relates these selective representations to 




“I will discuss how a combination of STDP and temporal coding can 
allow highly selective responses to develop to frequently encountered 
stimuli. Finally, I will argue that ‘grandmother cell’ coding has some 
specific advantages not shared by conventional distributed codes.”[13] 
1.4. Localist models in psychology 
Within psychology, the Interactive Activation (IA) model of visual word 
identification is an example of an early and influential theory that coded for 
familiar categories (words) with single units.[14] The IA model was again 
hierarchically organized with localist letter features at the input layer, localist 
letter detectors at a second layer, and localist word detectors at the output layer. 
In this scenario, a specific word is recognized when its localist word unit is 
activated beyond some threshold. Localist representations are commonplace in 
theories in psychology, including in models of visual word identification,[15] 
models of spoken word identification,[16] spoken word production,[17] face 
perception,[18] and many other domains of theorizing.  
Despite the existence of the above models, it is important to emphasize 
that most theorists in psychology and neuroscience strongly reject grandmother 
cells. For example, within psychology, the localist word representations in the 
IA model are often rejected in favour of distributed representations within the 
Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) models of word identifications (e.g., [19]).  
Even researchers who endorse localist codes in psychological models are rarely 
committed to the claim that their model is implemented with grandmother cells 
– instead, the models are considered theories of cognition with no commitments 
to neurophysiology.  Furthermore, in computational neuroscience where the 
models are intended to make claims about neural coding, it is very much a 
minority position to endorse grandmother cells.  The far more common claim is 
that single neurons do not code for specific categories.[20, 21]  As Averbeck, 
Latham, and Pouget put it: 
“As in any good democracy, individual neurons count for little; it is the 
population of activity that matters”. (p.358).[22] 
Similarly, researchers who carry out single-cell recording studies 
overwhelmingly reject grandmother cells.  But as we show below, this 
conclusion is compromised by the common assumption that grandmother cells 
should code for unfamiliar visual categories.  
To summarize then, a grandmother cell theory is committed to the claim 
that a subset of neurons selectively represents familiar visual categories at the 
basic level and at the subordinate level, and that different grandmother cells 
encode basic and subordinate visual categories (one cell coding for the basic 
visual category ‘bicycle’ and another cell coding for the subordinate ‘my 




identification of these familiar stimuli when their activation goes beyond some 
threshold.  The grandmother cell hypothesis does not reject distributed 
representations (both forms of representations may play a role in vision), 
whereas critics of the grandmother cell hypothesis claim that grandmother cells 
do not exist.   
1.5. The theoretical confusion that leads to the premature rejection of 
grandmother cell theory. 
Bowers has highlighted a number of confusions regarding grandmother 
cells that have led researchers to reject only straw-man versions of the 
hypotheses,[5]  such as the claim that there is one grandmother neuron per visual 
category (such that a loss of one neuron can lead to a failure to recognize your 
grandmother),[23] and the claim that grandmother cells respond to one category 
of input and remain entirely silent to all other categories (contrary to the 
common observation that a neuron responds above baseline to images from 
multiple categories.[24, 25] But there is no reason to adopt these characterizations 
of grandmother cell theory. Indeed, the grandmother/localist representations in 
the various models described above do not have the property that they only 
respond to one category of input and are silent to everything else. Rather they 
have the property that they respond most strongly to one category, and less 
strongly to visually similar inputs from different categories.  Of course, visually 
similar inputs should not activate a grandmother/localist unit beyond the 
threshold for identification, and if they do, it would result in a misidentification 
of the input.  For more detailed discussion and debate on this issue see ([5, 26, 27, 
28]).  Similarly, multiple redundant grandmother cells are consistent with 
grandmother cell theory,[4, 5, 25] and indeed, redundant localist codes can emerge 
in artificial neural network models after training,[29] making the model more 
robust to the removal of a single unit.  
But here we focus on the false claim that grandmother cell theories 
should explain how we perceive and identify unfamiliar things. This leads 
researchers to falsely reject grandmother cells on the basis that there are just not 
enough neurons in the brain to code for all possible unfamiliar stimuli,[27, 30] and 
most critical for present purposes, leads researchers to falsely reject 
grandmother cells on the basis of not finding neurons that respond selectivity to 
unfamiliar stimuli. 
2. What does the research show? 
In order to review as many studies as possible we describe some of the 
most relevant papers in the text and list other key studies in Table 1.  In many or 
most studies reviewed below the monkeys were repeatedly presented with the 
stimuli used to drive visual neurons, either before the recording session or 




often report that the stimuli tested were familiar.  However, in most of these 
studies the monkeys simply saw the images passively without making any 
response, or they performed some task that did not require them to identify the 
images at the basic or subordinate level.  Accordingly, there no reason to 
assume that the monkeys were able to identify the images at subordinate or 
basic levels.  Our main point is that if animals cannot identify the stimuli, there 
is no reason reject grandmother cells when single neurons fail to respond 
selectively to these stimuli.  
2.1. Chang and Tsao (2017)  
We start with the Chang and Tsao study[31] because it has received a lot of 
attention, makes strong claims in support of distributed over grandmother cell 
coding for face identification, and it is the most recent of a series of papers by 
Tsao and colleagues on the neural coding of faces (see Table 1 for other related 
studies from this group). 
The authors showed two monkeys images of faces while recording from 
neurons from the middle lateral (ML)/middle fundus (MF) and anterior medial 
(AM) regions of Inferotemporal (IT) cortex that have previously been shown to 
be involved in different aspects of face processing. The faces were synthetic 
human faces that had been transformed in high-dimensional space in order to 
assess the impact of various transformations on neural firing (See Figure 2a for 
example faces). The faces were presented for 150ms, interleaved with 150ms of 
a grey screen, each image being presented between three and five times. The 
stimuli included 2000 images of parametrized frontal faces, 2000 images of 
parameterized profile faces, and the task of the monkeys was simply to fixate on 
a fixation point for a juice reward, and accordingly, the faces were just viewed 
passively. They reported that a pattern of activation over approximately 200 
neurons coded for specific faces and took the findings to support distributed 
rather than grandmother cell coding. In the “In Brief” summary of their article 
they wrote: 
“Facial identity is encoded via a remarkably simple neural code that relies 
on the ability of neurons to distinguish facial features along specific axes 
in face space, disavowing the long-standing assumption that single 
face cells encode individual faces.” [31] [bold added] 
But no theory (grandmother or otherwise) should predicts that single cells in 
monkey brains should selectively respond to unfamiliar human faces. In the 
same way, no theory should expect to find neurons in human visual cortex that 
selectively responds to an unfamiliar monkey face. 
The conceptual confusion of the authors was highlighted more strongly in 
the interview with Doris Tsao who said the following in an interview linked 




“Before this work that is described in this paper itself... people thought at 
the highest levels of the brain’s face recognition system there are cells 
that are selective for specific individuals, all the people that you know 
and recognize there are cells encoding them. 
And obviously this raised a question, which is how can one have enough 
cells to represent all the people that you possible could recognize. There 
are 6 billion people on this earth, and obviously you do not have 6 
billion cells specialized for face recognition in your brain. So it was a 
mystery how it is ultimately done.” [32] [bold added]  
  The conclusion Tsao draws is that the brain must rely on distributed 
coding rather than grandmother cells. But given this conception of grandmother 
cells, it raises the question why the authors even bothered using their data to 
argue against grandmother cells given that it was ruled out a priori on the basis 
that there are not enough specialized neurons in a monkey brain. Nevertheless, 
this same conclusion was drawn by Quian Quiroga in a “Leading Edge 
Previews” article in the same issue entitled “How Do We Recognize a Face?”[1] 
He writes: 
“As the authors argue, their results imply that there are no detectors for 
face identity at the single neuron level in the face patch system and, 
consequently, this may put an end to the long-standing dispute about 
the existence of grandmother cells in visual cortex.”[1] [bold added] 
2.2. Rolls (2017) 
Rolls, in a special issue of a journal devoted to the topic of grandmother 
cells, reviewed a number of findings from his lab that he takes to be falsify the 
grandmother cells.[21] As he writes in the abstract: “The encoding of information 
in the primate inferior temporal visual cortex, hippocampus, orbitofrontal 
cortex, and insula is described. All these areas have sparse distributed graded 
firing rate representations”. However, once again, this conclusion come from 
studies in which animals were presented with unfamiliar stimuli, or where the 
familiarity of the stimuli where not discussed, and where the animal did not 
need to distinguish images one from another. 
For example, the first study he summarizes was carried out by Rolls and 
Tovee that assessed the neural coding of face and object identity in the temporal 
visual cortex.[33] This highly cited paper assessed the firing selectivity of 14 
neurons to a set of 68 stimuli. None of the neurons responded selectively to one 
of the stimuli, and Rolls takes the findings as inconsistent with the grandmother 
cell hypothesis.[21] This is a strong conclusion to reach on the basis of recording 
from 19 neurons, but more relevant for present purposes, the stimuli were 




stimuli that included images of woodland, countryside, and foods: some of these 
images are reproduced in Figure 2b. The monkey task was simply to look at the 
photos without responding (the monkeys received reward by licking a tube 
between image trials), and accordingly, there was no pressure to learn to the 
images. Given that the monkey was not trained to identify the stimuli, the 
experiment does not test the grandmother cell hypothesis. 
A search of Google Scholar using search terms ‘grandmother’ and ‘Rolls’ 
as author identifies 87 papers, and as far as we can tell there is only one paper 
where there was a brief note that selectivity might be greater for familiar 
categories,[34] but this was limited a single paragraph where they simply note 
that their findings “raise the possibility” (p. 213) that visual experience my 
impact on the tuning of single neurons. 
2.3. Lehky Kiani, Esteky, and Tanaka (2011) 
Lehky et al. recorded from 674 monkey inferotemporal cells, each 
stimulated by 806 object photographs.[35] Although they found some neurons to 
respond highly selectively, they failed to obtain evidence for grandmother cells, 
writing: 
“We believe that the data presented here do not support ‘grandmother 
cell’ coding.... On average, the second largest response was almost the 
same size as the largest response (89.3% for single-neuron responses, 
79.5% for population responses). This is not a characteristic of 
‘grandmother cell’ coding.”[35] 
But again, the conclusion is not justified given that the stimuli were not familiar 
and the monkeys were not trained to discriminate between the stimuli (see 
Figure 2c for some example images from this experiment).  Interestingly, the 
authors do leave open to door for grandmother cells for familiar, meaningful 
stimuli, writing: "Nevertheless, it is still possible that grandmother cell 
encoding could occur for a small number of special objects to which the 
observer was highly exposed, and which also had strong behavioral 
significance” (p. 1115).  Why such selective coding should be restricted to a 
few categories with strong behavioural significance as opposed to all visual 
categories that can be identified is unclear.  
2.4. Rust and DiCarlo (2012) 
Rust and DiCarlo designed a study to measure V4 and IT neuronal 
sparseness using a set of 300 natural images that included an object in its natural 
context, each object being distinct (it would be called by a different name).[36] 
The authors wrote that: “Images included a wide variety of content, including 
objects familiar to the animal, other (unfamiliar) animals, man-made objects, 




were impacted on familiarity. But the stimuli reported in their figures suggest 
that the vast majority of images would be unfamiliar, and a few example images 
are depicted here in Figure 2d. Indeed, the authors appear to consider familiarity 
of the images a problem, writing: “To guard against possible non-stationary 
effects (e.g., familiarity with the images), recordings were altered between V4 
and IT” (p., 10173). Again, the monkeys were not required to discriminate 
between any of these images. Based on the fact that they did not find any 
neurons that selectively responded to the test images, the authors argue that the 
visual system codes information in a distributed manner. 
  But again, no grandmother cell theory would predict selective responding 
to the unfamiliar images, and the authors did not specifically discuss or analyse 
the results for the familiar images in the experiment. As summarized in Table 1, 
other studies have also failed to observe highly selective responding of IT 
neurons in response to stimuli that a monkey was not trained to identify. 
There is yet another issue with some of the above studies that further 
weakens the conclusions that have been drawn regarding grandmother cells.  
That is, there is growing evidence that monkeys are quite poor at recognizing 
faces, and that they recognize faces in a qualitatively different way than 
humans.[37]  The findings include the observation that monkeys require 
extensive exposure and training in order to reach only moderate performance in 
identifying specific faces in a laboratory setting, performance on matching tasks 
is worse for faces than for other objects, and monkeys are no better at matching 
familiar compared to unfamiliar faces (unlike humans).  In addition, Macaques 
show no inversion effects, have no distinct ventral face-specific pathway, and 
no right hemisphere specialization for faces.  This further undermines the 
common rejection of grandmother cells based on studies that did not even train 
monkeys to identify (unfamiliar) faces.        
3. Highly selective representations are more often found when familiar 
stimuli are tested. 
A number of studies[38-41] have reported that the selectivity of neural 
firing increases as the stimuli become more familiar to the animal and this alone 
suggests that the above results provide a poor basis for characterizing the 
representations that support object and face identification.  But the important 
question for present purposes is whether stimuli that can be identified at a basic 
or subordinate level evoke levels of selectivity in visual neurons that are 
consistent with grandmother cells. 
The most high-profile set of experiments that have reported highly 
selective neural firing in response to familiar stimuli were recorded from the 
hippocampus and related structures in humans (e.g., the ‘Jennifer Aniston’ 




memory rather than the visual system, and accordingly, the results are not 
directly relevant to the classic grandmother cell hypothesis that is concerned 
with vision. Nevertheless, it raises the question is whether similar levels of 
selectivity can be obtained with familiar stimuli within the visual system.  
In fact, as reviewed below, a few studies have reported highly selective 
responding in IT cells when the monkey is presented with stimuli they can 
identify, and in one case, the level of selectivity is as high as any selectivity 
observed in the hippocampus. Although many of studies are quite old, they are 
highly relevant today. Unfortunately, the central message that selectivity can be 
extremely high for familiar objects in visual cortex seems to have been lost on 
the many recent experimental single-cell recording studies reviewed above as 
well as recent theoretical discussions of these findings,[1, 43, 44] but see [45] for a 
counter-example. 
3.1. Logothetis, Pauls, and Poggio (1995) 
Logothetis, Pauls, and Poggio trained two monkeys to identify over 100 
novel computer-generated objects from various viewpoints over the course of 
months.[46] After learning a substantial subset of stimuli, the monkeys performed 
a visual matching task in which they first fixated at a target stimulus from one 
viewpoint and then saw a series of test stimuli from various viewpoints that 
were from the same class or not, as illustrated in Figure 2e. The monkeys 
categorized the objects as matching or mismatching while the authors recorded 
from 796 neurons in the upper bank of the anterior medial temporal sulcus. The 
neurons showed a range of selectivity, a few (3/796; 0.37 %) responding 
selectively to only one object presented from any viewpoint, and a larger set 
(93/796; 11.6 %) responding selectively to a subset of views of one of the 
known target objects but less frequently (or not at all) to highly similar objects. 
These are perhaps the most selective responses ever recorded in any part of the 
brain.  Critically, no selective responses were encountered for views that the 
animal systematically failed to recognize. That is, highly selective codes were 
associated with the ability to identify the object. Furthermore, the authors found 
that the percentages of cells responding to objects from a given class correlated 
with the amount of training. This led the authors to write: “Thus, it seems that 
neurons in this area may develop complex configurational selectivity as the 
animal is trained to recognize specific objects”.[46] 
3.2. Sakai, Naya and Miyashita (1994) 
Sakai et al. trained monkeys to recognize 12 pairs of computer-generated 
Fourier patterns while recording from 474 neurons in Anterior Inferior 
Temporal cortex.[47]  One of the two stimuli from a paper (the “cue”) was 
presented for .5 seconds and after a five second delay the paired associate image 




associate pattern to receive an award.   This required monkeys to learn and 
discriminate these patterns. The authors identified 89 neurons that responded 
most strongly to one of the cue stimuli.  The Fourier pattern cue stimuli were 
then systematically manipulated in order to assess the impact of varying the 
learned images on neural responses. In the vast majority of cases, the neurons 
responded more strongly to the trained pattern compared to the untrained 
transformed ones, and in no case did the neuron respond more strongly to the 
transformed pattern. This suggests that the neurons were tuned to the trained 
visual patterns. This is exactly as one might expect from a grandmother cell 
theory. See Figure 2f for example of trained images and manipulated images. 
3.3. Perrett, Smith, Potter, Mistlin, Head, Milner and Jeeves (1985) 
Perrett et al. recorded from cells in the superior temporal sulcus of 
macaque monkey in studies that were designed to distinguish between faces 
from non-face stimuli (that is the general category of face rather than the 
identity of a specific face).[48] But during testing the authors noted that some 
cells that responded to one familiar person more than others. For instance, one 
cell responded more to a wide range of views of one familiar person (Paul 
Smith, one of the experimenters), compared to another (David Perrett, another 
experimenter), such that the identity of the person (based on whole body, not 
just face) could be determined by the activation of this one neuron. Perrett and 
colleagues took these findings to highlight the role of learning on neural 
selectivity, and the that their findings were at least consistent with grandmother 
cell coding schemes, writing: 
“The responses of these cells have many of the properties hypothesized 
for ‘gnostic units’ and provide insight into the final stages of visual 
processing leading to the recognition of an object as a face and more 
specifically the identity of the fact.”[49] 
Note, the term ‘gnostic unit’ is being used there the same way as grandmother 
cell.  
3.4. Kobatake, Wang, and Tanaka (1998) 
 Kobatake et al. trained 2 monkeys to discriminate between 28 moderately 
complex shapes and then recorded from 131 cells in inferotemporal cortex.  A 
single shape (for examples see Figure 2) was displayed on a computer screen 
and it disappeared when it was touched.  After a short delay the stimulus was 
displayed along with four additional foils from the same set of 28 stimuli.  The 
task was to select the repeated stimulus.  Training was extensive and was 
completed when the monkeys performed 500 successful trials per day with a 
success rate of over 75%.  Neural recordings to these stimuli were performed 




inferotemporal neurons in two additional monkeys who were not trained to 
identify and remember the stimuli.   
For the trained monkeys there were 28 cells that maximally responded to 
one of the trained stimuli, and for these neurons, an average of 3 other stimuli 
from the trained set evoked responses greater than 50% of individual cells' 
maximal response.  Based on this the authors concluded “The broad tuning may 
suggest that the discrimination depended on activity of cell population”.  
Unfortunately, however, the authors did not report whether any of the 26 critical 
failed to respond strongly to other stimuli (the overall average of 3 stimuli 
evoking strong response may well have included some neurons that were more 
selective).  The failure to report the most selective responding neuron is 
unfortunate.  Importantly, the authors also reported the selectivity of the 
neurons was much greater for the trained compared to non-trained monkeys, 
highlighting the fact that selectivity is greater for stimuli that can be identified. 
3.5. Khuvis, Yeagle, Norman, Grossman, Malach and Mehta (2018) 
As far as we are aware, Khuvis et al. have provided the first test of 
whether individual neurons in humans visual cortex code for specific familiar 
faces.[50] The authors recorded from 63 neurons in ventral temporal cortex 
across eight patients.  A set of images of 10 famous faces as well as 10 body 
parts, 10 houses, 10 tools, and 10 abstract patterns and were presented centrally 
and participants performed a 1-back task during recording in which they 
indicated whether current stimulus matched the previous one.  Twenty-six 
neurons were found to be selective for the general category faces, and 7 for non-
face categories.  However, within the face category, the authors did not report 
any neurons that selectively responded to one face.  It will be important to see 
whether similar results are obtained in humans in follow-up studies, especially it 
is possible to test a wider range of neurons and face images.  
We want to be clear that we do not take reports of extremely selectivity in 
visual neurons in response to trained stimuli as evidence in support of the 
grandmother cell hypothesis.  There are too few relevant studies, the results are 
mixed, and it perfectly plausible that the most selective neurons are not so 
selective that the they are tuned to maximally respond to one visual category. 
Nevertheless, the most striking demonstrations of selectivity are consistent with 
the grandmother cell hypothesis, and in our view, it is premature to reject 
grandmother cells based on current findings.   
4. Conclusions and Outlook 
  We hope that most readers will accept our argument that it is 
inappropriate to reject grandmother cells on the basis of testing stimuli that 
cannot be identified, and it is an important observation that neural selectivity is 




will continue to dismiss the grandmother cell hypothesis. The notion that 
amongst the billions of neurons in a brain there is a subset of neurons tuned to 
code for specific categories might seem implausible. We understand this 
intuition, but it is worth emphasizing again that there are existing models of 
visual object recognition that are designed to be biologically plausible that have 
grandmother cells.[9] Indeed, there are biologically plausible models of visual 
object identification that learn grandmother cells.[12] Even artificial neural 
network models that are claimed to learn distributed codes in fact learn 
grandmother representations when trained to co-activate multiple words (or 
objects or faces) at the same in short-term memory.[29, 51] These findings suggest 
that there are computational advantages of grandmother cells in the context of 
short-term memory, much like there are computational advantages of learning 
highly selective representations in the hippocampus for the sake of episodic 
memory.[52] Grandmother cells have also been observed in artificial neural 
network models that learn to identify faces.[53]  
In our view, these computational considerations, in combination with the 
empirical findings above, should lead researchers and theorists to take the 
grandmother cell hypothesis more seriously.  Going forward, researchers need a 
better understanding of existing models of face and object identification that 
include grandmother cells, the conditions in which artificial neural networks 
learn grandmother cells,[29, 51] and then design experiments that compare the 
selectivity of these units to the selectivity of visual neurons responding to 
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Figure 1.  The network was trained to recognize objects (as depicted in the top 
row), and neurons in the hidden layer of the network learned to respond 
preferentially to image patterns that look like the objects (as depicted in the 
bottom row). That is, these neurons learned to represent information much like 
grandmother cells. Taken from [8] 
 
Figure 2.  Stimuli used across multiple experiments: a.[31]; b.[21]; c.[35]; d.[36]. 







       Table 1 









Dubois, J., de Berker, A. O., 
& Tsao, D. Y.  Faces, FOB* No 
No mention of GMC** 
(propose DC***) 
2015 
Meyers, E. M., Borzello, M., 
et al.   Faces, FOB No 
No mention of GMC (propose 
DC) 
2015 
Taubert, J., Van Belle, G., et 
al.  Faces No Did not discuss coding 
2012 Issa, E. B., & DiCarlo, J. J.  Faces  No Did not discuss coding 
2010 
Freiwald, W. A., & Tsao, D. 
Y.  Faces and FOB No 
No mention of GMC (propose 
DC) 
2008 
Meyers, E. M., Freedman, 
D. J.,  et al. 
Animals (cats or 
dogs) No 
No mention of GMC (propose 
DC) 
2007 Franco, L., Rolls, E. T., et al.  
Faces, objects, 
scenes No Did not discuss coding 
2006 
Tsao, D. Y., Freiwald, W. 
A., et al.   Faces, FOB No 
No mention of GMC (propose 
DC) 
2005 
Freedman, D. J., 
Riesenhuber, et al. 
Animals (cats v 
dogs) No Did not discuss coding 
2001 




No mention of GMC (propose 
DC) 
2001 
Sheinberg, D. L., & 
Logothetis, N. K. Objects No Did not discuss coding 
2001 Tamura H, Tanaka K Objects, shapes No Did not discuss coding 
1998 Booth, M. C., & Rolls, E. T.  Objects No Reject GMC (propose DC) 
1997 
Rolls, E. T., Treves, A., & 
Tovee, M. J.  Faces No Reject GMC (propose DC) 
1996 
Higuchi, S. I., & Miyashita, 
Y.  Fractal patterns No Did not discuss coding 
1995 Rolls, E. T., & Tovee, M. J.  Faces No Reject GMC (propose DC) 
1992 Young, M. P., & Yamane, S.  Faces No Reject GMC (propose DC) 
1985 
Perrett, D. I., Smith, P. A. J., 
et al.  Faces No Agnostic  
1984 Rolls, E. T.  Faces No Reject GMC (propose DC) 
1984 Desimone, R., et al.  Faces and hands No Reject GMC (propose DC) 
1982 
Perrett, D. I.,  Rolls, E.T., &  
Caan, W.  Faces No 
No mention of GMC (propose 
DC) 
     
     
 
*FOB:  images of faces, objects, bodyparts; **GMC: grandmother cell coding; ***DC: 
distributed coding 
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